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Adding to the impressive body of work that has made her a leading voice
in the fields of both alternative dispute resolution and professional responsibility, Carrie Menkel-Meadow's Saltman Lecture connects the theoretical exploration currently occurring on two parallel tracks: (1) theories of justice that
1
investigate the ideal of a deliberative democracy; and (2) theories of alterna2
tive dispute resolution arising from its reflective practice. As she notes, theorists on both tracks are grappling with similar questions about the processes or
conditions that will best bring together parties with widely divergent viewpoints to engage in consensus-building dialogue around contested issues.
However, while the tracks are parallel and both move in the same direction, they rarely meet. Menkel-Meadow encourages the political theorists,
whose abstract models for deliberative democracy have, in her view, fallen into
unfortunate ruts of dualism and polarity,3 to learn from the reflective dispute
resolution practitioners, who have experimented with a variety of processes for
creative problem-solving with multiple parties, issues, modes of communication, and forms of decision.4 An integration of theoretical and practical wisdom can pave the way, she suggests, toward a new role for lawyers possessing
both legal and process expertise, to serve as neutral facilitators of participatory
5
consensus-building processes around complex and multi-faceted problems.
The expertise that they gain in this role can make them architects, not only of
process, but of social justice as well.6
While Menkel-Meadow focuses on what political theory can learn from
the practice of alternative dispute resolution, I explore the related question,
latent in Menkel-Meadow's essay, of what alternative dispute resolution theorists need from a theory of justice. For the practice of alternative dispute resolution to provide lessons for political theories of deliberative democracy, the
practice needs to be contextualized in a normative vision of justice that
addresses the relationship between procedure and justice ideals. In other
words, it cannot merely describe what happens in experimental consensus* Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas.
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building processes or other alternative dispute resolution settings, but must
articulate what should ideally be occurring.
Normatively grounded visions are especially important in the field of
alternative dispute resolution as it moves from the experimental and voluntary
forums that Menkel-Meadow describes to increasingly becoming institutionalized in court proceedings. 7 I begin by briefly reviewing the relationship
between justice and the adversary system on which our traditional legal system
is based, in light of two types of critiques that have given impetus to the movement in favor of alternative dispute resolution procedures. I then make explicit
three distinct normative conceptions that need to be articulated more fully, if
consensus-building processes are to provide a viable alternative to adversary
proceedings. Finally, I look at how some of the theories of deliberative democracy discussed by Menkel-Meadow can inform alternative dispute resolution
theory in articulating these normative conceptions, as well as identifying some
of the specific points at which theory needs to learn from practice.
I.

THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM:

Two

CRITIQUES

The adversary system of justice is based on a well-defined - albeit flawed
- conception of how substantive justice emerges from adversary participation. 8
The ideal of adversary justice supposes that by appointing a zealous advocate to
each side of a dispute to investigate facts and integrate them into legal arguments, as well as to challenge the facts and legal arguments presented by the
other side, the strongest possible case will be made for each participant. In
addition, each side will be able to provide a check against the other, correcting
for biases, self-interest and manipulation. An impartial decision-maker, hearing the strongest possible case for each side from an advocate with zealous
devotion to the interests of a single party, will be in the best position to determine the truth of the matter and to make a decision that is just under the circumstances. 9 In other words, substantive justice emerges precisely because of
the adversary presentation of facts and legal arguments.
There are two types of critiques of this adversary model of justice. One is
that the "justice conditions" that define the ideal are rarely, if ever, met. For
the adversary system to work according to its ideal, all sides to a dispute must
have equally balanced resources, access to zealous representation, and relevant
information.'° The decision maker must also be free of bias and undue influ7 Menkel-Meadow notes the trend that "new processes have begun to influence traditional
legal institutions," citing as examples the emergence of "problem-solving courts" that coordinate agency responses in family law and drug areas as well as business, negotiated rulemaking in administration agencies, and the "collaborative lawyering" movement. Id. at 361.
8 For a critique of this vision of adversary justice, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 67-103 (1988).
9 See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 35-

39 (2002) (citing psychological studies that support the hypothesis that adversary testing is
the most effective way to force adversaries and fact finders past their initial impressions to
investigate and consider a fuller factual picture).
10 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION

53-58 (2000).
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ence. II However, because resources are not distributed equally among litigants, because lawyers' loyalty and zeal are distorted by self-interested pursuit
of profit, and because decision makers are inescapably tainted by bias, the
adversary system rarely, if ever, lives up to its ideal.
This first type of critique is essentially practical in nature. It tests the
operation of the system against its ideal, showing that the machinery of the
adversary system allows - and even encourages - results that are contrary to its
goals. Rather than truth and justice, adversary litigation produces obfuscation
and strategic manipulation. Lawyers' professional training encourages narrow
framing of their clients' interests into "legal issues" that may or may not capture the clients' true wishes, a process that distorts the clients' goals and stunts
2
The duty of zealous advothe lawyers' ability to solve problems creatively.
cacy deteriorates into excesses of adversarial zeal such as discovery abuse,
forum shopping, the filing of frivolous pleadings and motions, and deceptive
practices such as witness coaching and manipulative cross-examination that
warp the truth. 1 3 Moreover, lawyers have self-interested reasons for maintaining adversarial excesses, because these excesses require heavy investments of
billable hours. However, the existence of poor lawyer-client communication
and sharp practices does not necessarily call for the abolishment of the adversary system; it merely suggests avenues for reforming procedures to make them
work according to their intended goals, or changing the structures for regulating
the behavior of lawyers, or both.
The second type of critique of the adversary model of justice is deeper and
more profound, questioning the theoretical efficacy of the adversary system
ideal at its core. Drawing on post-modem critiques of objectivity and neutrality, this type of critique suggests that "the truth" and "the facts" are not singular, knowable commodities that can be delivered at the conclusion of any
process. 4 Because different people simply view "the facts" differently, there
is not a right answer to the question of "what really happened?" that adversary
testing can reveal.' 5 Because truths are multiple, "truth-finding" is not a viable
6
Under this
goal around which to structure the ideal of adversary justice.
view, there is no objectively determinable "right result" of dispute resolution
proceedings.
This second kind of critique does not merely require a tinkering with the
machinery of justice, but an overhaul of its underlying conception and meaning. When we take away the "right result" - or substantive justice - as the goal
of legal proceedings, we deprive the adversary system of the ideal against
which its processes can be measured. Without an outcome-relative goal, we
lose the ability to mount the first type of critique that the adversary system is
1 Id.
12 For an elaboration of this argument, see Warren Lehman, The Pursuitof a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979).
iB See generally RHODE, supra note 10, at 81-115.

i4 Menkel-Meadow advanced this kind of critique in an influential essay. Carrie MenkelMeadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,Multicultural World, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).

15 See id. at 14-15; see also Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation and Alternative
Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 10

CLINICAL

16 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 30.

L. REV. 833, 851 (2004).
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failing to live up to its ideal. Responding to this second type of critique
requires a new way of conceptualizing dispute resolution, not as a search for
"the truth" or for "justice," but as something else.
The question of what ought to replace the search for a unitary truth or
justice as the goal of dispute resolution processes is central to the project of
developing alternative models for dispute resolution. It is in defining and articulating this alternative that the reflective practice of alternative dispute resolution can help inform political theories of deliberative democracy.
II.

ALTERNATIVE

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION AND THE NEED FOR A THEORY
OF JUSTICE

For the practice of alternative dispute resolution to have the capacity to
inform political theory, it needs to be based in normative conceptions, not
merely of how alternative dispute resolution works, but of how it ought to
work. I suggest that there are three normative conceptions latent in the development of alternative models of dispute resolution, each of which needs to be
articulated more fully, for alternative methods to step into the gap opened by
the critiques of the adversary system of justice. These three normative conceptions are: (1) a vision of "just harmony" that can serve as a goal against which
the dispute resolution procedures can be measured; (2) a vision of "authentic
participation" that can distinguish legitimate involvement and engagement in a
process from its strategic manipulation; and (3) a vision of "appropriate fit" that
can provide an evaluative framework for determining what types of dispute
resolution procedures are best matched to resolving different types of conflicts.
First, without recourse to truth or the "right result," alternative dispute
resolution needs a vision of how justice would look, in order to serve as a goal
against which the operation of dispute resolution procedures can be measured. 7 Menkel-Meadow has invoked Confucian principles at the heart of
Chinese mediation, which she characterizes as being "designed to seek 'harmony, not truth,"' as a possible basis for a legal system organized around
"problem-solving" rather than "truth-finding." 8 Rob Rubinson has suggested
that in rejecting the search for unitary truth, the primary goal of mediation
should be to get disputing parties to move beyond their own perspectives of
"what happened," and to recognize the perspectives of other disputants.' 9
Rather than viewing dispute resolution as a striving to determine which party's
story of "what happened" is factually and normatively correct, Rubinson views
mediation as a process of motivating the parties to engage in a "collaborative
striving to overcome conflict."2 °
However, the goals of harmony and "overcoming conflict" are themselves
open to normative challenge. Anthropologist Laura Nader has criticized the
alternative dispute resolution movement as a movement to "trade justice for
17 For a discussion of the importance of defining the goals of procedural justice, see Jean R.
Stemlight, ADR is Here: PreliminaryReflections on Where it Fits in a System Of Justice, 3
NEV. L. 289 (2003).
18 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 30-31.
19 Rubinson, supra note 15, at 851.
20 Id] at 857

Winter 2004/05]

LEARNING FROM PRACTICE

harmony." 2 1 She sees the invocation of "harmony ideology" to pacify the
assertion of rights as embodying a reassertion of social control in response to
the legal rights and law reform movements of the 1960's and 1970's.22
Although Nader's view is perhaps overstated, it points to the importance of
being able to distinguish normatively between harmony that resolves conflict
and harmony that merely suppresses or silences the voices of those without
political power. To make the distinction between conflict resolution and conflict suppression - and to defend the vision of justice as harmony - alternative
dispute resolution needs a theory of "just harmony. 2 3
Second, even with a well-established vision of "just harmony" in place as
a goal, alternative dispute resolution needs a theory of justice to help distinguish the "authentic" use of procedure from its "strategic manipulation. 2 4
Menkel-Meadow's own vision of lawyers as neutral facilitators in consensusbuilding processes cites the importance of the facilitators' process expertise,
precisely so that they can "minimize the strategic gaming and bargaining that
may occur when unequal parties come together to deliberate."2 5 Some of the
most potent criticism of alternative dispute resolution has focused on the "process dangers" of informal proceedings for parties with unequal bargaining
power.2 6 However, to evaluate whether a procedure is being used authentically
or strategically, it must be measured against some normative ideal of what full,
true or fair participation would look like.
Finally, alternative dispute resolution needs a theory of "appropriate fit"
between types of disputes and procedures for resolving them, to realize its ideal
of becoming a field of "appropriate dispute resolution, 2 7 symbolized by the
21

Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification

in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 1 (1993).
22 It should be noted that Nader's critique is directed at "the belief that harmony in the guise
of compromise or agreement is ipso facto better than an adversary posture." Id. at 3. It is
not directed at the more nuanced view of Lon Fuller that "different problems require different solutions" and that "there is nothing inherently humane about one forum or another." Id.
at 12 (discussing Lon Fuller's unpublished but widely discussed manuscript, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication (1961-1962)). Nader notes that a later version of this manuscript was
later published in 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Id. at 12 n.46.
23 See Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 50 (2004) (recalling the slogan
"There can be no peace without justice" as having "particular relevance to our field [ADR]
today").
24 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 359 (noting the danger that deliberative democracy
may be "manipulated or used strategically, rather than authentically").
25 Id. at 362. Menkel-Meadow has explored the potential for repeat players - the "haves" to manipulate processes of alternative dispute resolution in earlier work. See Carrie MenkelMeadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative JudicialSystems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19 (1999).
26 Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
27 Menkel-Meadow has expressed her preference for the phrase "appropriate dispute resolution" over "alternative dispute resolution" as a more accurate moniker for the acronym ADR.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 37. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25, at 23-24
(urging the use of the terminology "appropriate dispute resolution" both as a recognition of
the reality that "adjudication in a court is now more the alternative than the norm" and as a
signal that courts should be providing a "variety of choices about how best to handle particular issues, problems, disputes, conflicts and transactions"). I deviate from her preference
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metaphor of the "multi-door courthouse. 2 8 In this ideal, the full panoply of
methods for resolving disputes would be available to resolve contested matters,
ranging from formal adjudication to informal mediation, and different kinds of
disputes would be routed to their most appropriate venue.2 9 Unfortunately,
sometimes - perhaps all too often - alternatives to litigation are institutionalized, not because they are the most appropriate, but because courts perceive
them as efficient ways to reduce judicial caseloads. 3 ° Other times they are
mandated in contract terms by repeat players to serve their own interests at the
expense of one-shot parties who have little bargaining power, forcing a literal
trade-off of procedural rights that would otherwise be guaranteed as an option
for resolving future disputes.3 1 To properly route different kinds of disputes to
their appropriate berths, alternative dispute resolution needs a normative theory
of what circumstances make particular kinds of dispute resolution procedures
appropriate.
These three normative conceptions - a vision of "just harmony," a vision
of "authentic participation," and a theory of "appropriate fit" - define what
alternative dispute resolution needs from a theory of justice. Hence, as much as
theory needs to be informed by practice, practice also needs to be informed by
theory. Recently developing theories of deliberative democracy hold out some
promise for helping alternative dispute resolution theorists in the project of
articulating the normative ideals on which their reflective evaluation of practice
is based.
because the model of adversary litigation is still very much in place as the normative vision
of just procedures.
28 The term "multi-door courthouse" originated with Frank Sander's influential address to
the 1976 Pound Conference. Jeffrey Stempel, Reflections on JudicialADR and the MultiDoor Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, I I
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 297, 324-34 (1996). The Pound Conference is viewed as the
"kickoff' event or "turning point" for the modern ADR movement. Id. at 309-10; Nader,
supra note 21, at 5.
29 For a description and critique of Sander's multi-door courthouse, see Stempel, supra note
28, at 324-34. Menkel-Meadow offers a similar vision in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14,
at 32-44 (recommending adversarial litigation as a "last resort" and offering a list of possible
alternatives). For a recent explication of Menkel-Meadow's thinking about the variety of
modes of conflict resolution that might be appropriate to resolving different kinds of issues,
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem-Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a MultidisciplinaryContext, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 7,
24-29 (2004).
30 Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-ConnectedMediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2001);
see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 486-90 (1985) (outlining disputes
arising from the different values that judicial settlement conferences are thought to promote,
including but not limited to efficiency); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle":
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1388 (1994) (concluding, after evaluating settlement against a variety of different evaluative measures,
including efficiency, that the task is to "have a sense of which qualities we consider important in a particular settlement arena" and to "encourage settlements that display desirable
qualities").
31 See Jean R. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OIuo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669 (2001).
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THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Like alternative dispute resolution theorists, the political theorists of deliberative democracy are struggling to fill the gap that has opened in the wake of
the loss of faith in substantive definitions of justice. What they offer is a procedurally-based vision, anchored by principles of inclusive and participatory
deliberation that measure justice, not by the outcome of processes, but by their
participatory character." Like alternative dispute resolution, in these theories,
the goal is not deliberation for the sake of reaching the "right result," but deliberation for the sake of allowing all to hear and be heard - to transform the
views of others and to allow one's own views to be transformed - in the process of coming to a decision over a contested matter.3 3 Although it is claimed
that inclusive processes will create better results because they permit more facets or perspectives of a problem to be examined, 34 the real benefit is that outbecause the
comes will be perceived as more legitimate by all stakeholders
3
stakeholders have been included in the deliberation process. 1
Theories of deliberative democracy can help inform the normative conceptions that alternative dispute resolution theorists need to develop and articulate,
just as reflections on the practice of mediation and consensus-building
processes can help inform the theories of deliberative democracy. For example, the first normative conception that alternative dispute resolution needs - a
theory of "just harmony" - can be informed by the theoretical debate occurring
in philosophical scholarship about justice. The loss of faith in the yardstick of
substantive justice has arisen in part from the recognition that modem democratic societies lack moral consensus at a very deep level that makes moral
conflict a persistent and permanent feature, defying transcendence or mediation
into a harmonious resolution.3 6
In light of this deep and persistent moral pluralism, it can be asked
whether "harmony" is a realistic goal - or a desirable one - in modem societies.3 7 Discussions of the benefits of harmonious alternative dispute resolution
32 See generally JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM,

COMPLEXITY AND

DEMOCRACY (1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
13 For an overview of the different definitions of deliberation, see Jon Elster, Introduction,
in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 1-3 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).

34 This is what James Bohman has called the "epistemic" benefit of deliberation, that it
"improves outcomes insofar as it helps citizens construct an interpretation of the decision
and its consequence in light of what all those affected think about the matter at hand."
BOHMAN, supra note 32, at 6.
15 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 41-42 (arguing that deliberative democracy "contributes to the legitimacy of decisions made under conditions of scarcity" because
it "brings previously excluded voices into politics").
36 Id. at 18-26 (discussing the sources of persistent moral disagreement); see also JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54-58 (1993) (discussing the factors that contribute to fundamental moral disagreement).
37 See generally STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000) (arguing against the
pathologizing of conflict as a moral vice); Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuitof the Ideal, in ISAIAH
BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 1, 19 (1990) (arguing that a more appropriate
ideal for a modem morally pluralistic society is a vision of "promoting and preserving an
uneasy equilibrium, which is constantly threatened and constantly in need of repair").
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are often based on paradigm cases in which underlying interests converge, if
only the parties could hear each other over the barriers created3 by
the intracta8
ble positions in which their interests have become embedded.
Attention to the theoretical work addressing the causes and sources of
moral conflict, and the nature of justice in light of moral pluralism, can help
alternative dispute resolution theorists develop richer and more nuanced understandings of the goals of dispute resolution in the absence of the convergence
of interests paradigm.3 9 Bohman, for example, has suggested that in light of
the depth of disagreement over fundamental matters, the goal of deliberation is
not necessarily consensus, but "continued cooperation in public deliberation,
even with persistent disagreement."4 Gutmann and Thompson, similarly, do
not suppose that deliberation will resolve moral disagreement, but argue that
with deliberation "citizens stand a better chance of ...living with those [moral
disagreements] that will inevitably persist."4 These qualifications of the goal
of harmony recognize that in a pluralistic society, the features of fluidity and
openness to continued challenge may be just as important as the quelling of
disputes.
Theories of justice in a deliberative democracy can also help shed light on
the normative concept of "authentic participation" that differentiates the proper
use of alternative dispute resolution processes from their strategic manipulation. Because these theories focus on participation as the keystone of justice,
there is a vibrant theoretical discourse around the conditions that define participation. Some theories focus on the giving of "public reasons, '' 4 or on offering
reasons in a "spirit of reciprocity, 43 as the earmarks of authentic participation.
Others are less cognitively constrained, and attempt to make room for empathic
perspective-shifting and personal storytelling as legitimate deliberative mechanisms. 44 Theorists also explore the ways in which deliberation can be strategi3 Welsh, supra note 23, at 50-51 (discussing the gap between the "iconic images" of
resolvable conflict that are used to teach dispute resolution and the "small and increasingly
isolated segments of the current practice of mediation and arbitration" that they represent).
One classic example that I have used in teaching is the Ugli Orange Case from ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING

To

YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN

59 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
" Menkel-Meadow's example of facilitating "structured conversations" of affirmative
action and abortion are examples that defy the paradigm of convergent interests and require
re-evaluation of goals. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 364. See also Marc Howard Ross
& Jay Rothman, Issues of Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management, in MARC
HOWARD Ross & JAY ROTHMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN ETHNIC CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) (arguing for the importance of articulating theories of "success" and "failure"
in ethnic conflict resolution projects other than achieving consensus, and allowing the goals
of the projects to be set collaboratively by the stakeholders and to be open to change over
time).
40 See BOHMAN, supra note
41 GUTMANN & THOMPSON,

32, at 89.
supra note 32 at 51.

See RAWLS, supra note 36, at 212-30 (arguing that in debating fundamental questions,
citizens must conduct their discussions "based on values that the others can reasonably be
expected to endorse").

42

43

See

GUTMANN

&

THOMPSON,

supra note 32, at 52-94 (arguing that in deliberating, citi-

zens and officials must appeal to "mutually acceptable" moral reasons and empirical claims).
4' Bohman, for example, includes in his "dialogical mechanisms" of public deliberation:
"back-and-forth exchanges around differences in biographical and collective historical
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cally manipulated, examining the "pathologies of deliberation" caused by the
ability to induce preferences, or create "false beliefs." 45
This theoretical identification of conditions for both authentic participation
and strategic manipulation can be especially helpful in providing evaluative
frameworks that go beyond reliance on participant satisfaction in dispute resolution processes. Nancy Welsh, for example, has studied the justice of courtconnected mediation in the context of procedural justice literature, which
focuses on whether participants "feel like justice is being done."'4 6 This focus
on participant satisfaction is consistent with the aims of deliberative democracy
to define justice according to participation rather than outcome, and is central

to the larger justice goals of legitimacy.4

However, a reliance on participant

satisfaction should also be understood within the theoretical context of the
"pathologies of deliberation" and its potentials for manipulation.
IV.

LEARNING FROM PRACTICE

Despite what theory can offer, the process of articulating the conditions
for authentic participation is a two-way street in which theory must also learn
from practice. 48 As Menkel-Meadow notes, abstract theorizing about the conditions that define participatory deliberation is often carried out in the shadow
of experience with the dualistic adversary models, and often seems trapped
within the idea of a "back-and-forth" exchange between two sides of a question. 49 Those who study and practice alternative dispute resolution "on the
ground" see the limitations of these assumptions against which - and within
which - theory is developed. Reflective practitioners need to contextualize
their experiences within theory, but they can also use their experiences to test
the presumptions on which theory is based, expanding and enriching the possibilities for further theoretical exploration.5 °
The contributions of practice to theory are highlighted in the last area in
need of normative articulation: the conception of "appropriate fit" between
conflicts and dispute resolution processes. There is a tendency in theory to
provide final, sweeping answers that systematize experience. This tendency, at
its best, creates vocabularies for categorizing and explaining experience, and
allows for normative evaluation of experience. 5 1 At its worst, it constructs oneexperiences," BOHMAN, supra note 32, at 60; and the "shifting and exchanging perspectives"
that occur in the course of speaking and listening in dialogue. Id. at 63.
'5 See, e.g., Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY,
supra note 33, at 123; Adam Przeworski, Deliberation and Ideological Domination, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 140.
46 Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals In Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got To
Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 791 (2001).
17 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
48 Or perhaps, to avoid the duality embedded in even that metaphor, it is a rotary or "roundabout" in which several roads converge in a circle that leads all into one another.
49 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 358.
50 Jean Sternlight has referred to a similar vision of the interaction between theory and

practice as a "symbiotic integration" of theory and practice. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 707 (1996).
51 See id. at 736-41.
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size-fits-all boxes that constrain the development of new practices based on
practice based on what we
untested theoretical assumptions, and homogenizes
52
think we know about what will work best.
The need to think "outside the boxes" of theory is particularly important in
the project of developing normative conceptions of "appropriate fit" between
different kinds of disputes and methods for resolving them. The theoretical
exploration of the goals ("just harmony") and methods ("authentic participation") of dispute resolution processes can help define broad frameworks within
which the normative questions about "appropriate fit" can be posed. For example, one might draw on theories of justice to determine that the goals of certain
kinds of disputes should be different: harmony in some types of cases in which
parties will have continuing needs to interact; settlement according to certain
substantively or procedurally defined parameters in others; or merely providing
a forum for different parties to hear one another where the conflicts are particularly emotionally charged or intractably opposed. Or it might be theorized that
different methods of participation - private versus public, with or without lawyers, mediation or bargaining - may be appropriate to different types of disputes. 53 However, it is only by testing the assumptions upon which those
frameworks are built against the experience of those who implement the new
processes, that the questions will be answered.

52 For example, Craig McEwen has used the experience of lawyer participation in mediation

in Maine to challenge the prevailing notion that the presence of lawyers disrupts the objectives of mediation. Craig McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Media-

tion, 79 MINN. L. Rav. 1317 (1995).
13 The posing and theorizing of these kinds of questions with reference to theories of justice
is at the core of Menkel-Meadow's current work. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 1.

